We investigate the role that labor costs hold in exporters' performance. To do so, we exploit a large-scale French reform that granted most firms a tax credit proportional to the wagebill of their employees paid below a given threshold. This policy effectively translated into a cut in labor cost whose magnitude varies depending on firm-specific wage structures. We use the predicted treatment intensity based on pre-reform composition of the labor force as an instrument for the actual policyinduced firm-level change in labor costs. Although our point estimates are consistent with commonly estimated firm-level trade elasticities combined with reasonable labor shares in total costs, coefficients are found to be very noisy, suggesting lack of robust evidence of a causal effect of the policy. We discuss several potential explanations for our results as well as their implications.
Introduction
Competitiveness is one of the most important concerns that is used by policy makers to justify policy reforms aimed at improving/restoring the ability of domestic firms to exhibit high performance on international markets. While the objective is usually macro-economic in nature, with a goal to ensure a sustainable path of trade balance, the policies involved are often micro-economic. This is especially true in currency unions such as the eurozone, where changes in the nominal exchange rate intended to reduce the consumer-relevant price abroad are not an option. Some of the remaining policy tools available are directed at non-price competitiveness (R&D tax breaks being one example, see e.g. Hombert and Matray 2015) . It is however likely that the impact of this type of measures only manifests itself in the long-run. Shorter-run policies are aimed at reducing the costs of domestic firms with respect to foreign competitors so as to strengthen price competitiveness. Numerous channels of action are possible. The basic idea is that export performance of firms is driven by the export price set by the firm, and that the pass-through of the cut in unit costs to lower export price is high enough to ensure that the market share captured by domestic firms on international markets increases. Any policy reducing the explicit or implicit cost of exports will work under those assumptions. Reducing the price of energy (or the regulations related to how clean the production process is) is an option that has been invoked by the recently elected US administration.
1 Cutting the costs of using domestic labor is another obvious candidate that can take different forms: wage moderation, flexibility in labor market regulations, or transferring the tax burden of social contributions (payroll tax) to other tax sources for instance.
Our paper focuses on the last of those policies. Since 2013, the French government implemented a tax credit aimed at boosting competitiveness and employment, named the CICE in French (standing for Competitiveness and Employment Tax Credit or Crédit d'impôt pour la compétitivité et l'emploi in French). The policy is intended to act as a cut in unit labor costs (see Sect. 3 for all details on the policy change). The tax credit is set proportional to the share of the wagebill paid to workers under a certain threshold (2.5 times the national minimum wage). Each firm receives a transfer of 4% (raised to 6% since 2014) of the total wagebill that is under the threshold. This policy design gives us a natural experiment where we can match for each firm the intensity of labor cost reduction (that varies according to its original labor force composition), and its export performances (intensive and extensive margins) before and after treatment. Our results cast doubts on the effects to be expected from reductions in labor costs regarding export performance. While the magnitude of our point estimates are consistent with expectations, i.e. commonly estimated firm-level trade elasticities multiplied by reasonable values of the share of labor in total costs, coefficients are found to be very noisy, suggesting lack of robust evidence of a causal effect of the policy.
A recent paper with similar motivation to ours is Decramer et al. (2016) , which looks at how unit labor costs affect export performance using Belgian firm-level data. This paper finds quite large and significant elasticities, when regressing the change in (log of) exports on the change in (log of) unit labor costs. When adopting the same specification, we also find that a 10% increase in unit labor costs is associated with around 2% lower exports. Another related paper is Gan et al. (2016) , who evaluate how regionally-driven changes in the minimum wage faced by Chinese exporters affect their competitiveness. In contrast to Decramer et al. (2016) , we evaluate a policy that specifically reduced labor costs in a heterogeneous manner depending on the initial wage structure of the firm. This offers a natural instrumentation strategy based on the administrative threshold that determines which employees are eligible to the policy. Compared to Gan et al. (2016) , our work does not rely on the exogeneity of changes in the minimum wage decided by local authorities. The policy change is national, and heterogeneity in the treatment only comes through pre-treatment composition of the labor force across firms. The French government had an aim to bolster national competitiveness, not export performance of the subset of firms that had a specially high share of workers below a certain threshold. The choice of the precise threshold was itself not anticipated, and driven by a mix of considerations related to the impact on unemployment and to budgetary constraints rather than pre-trends of different groups of firms.
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In addition to evaluating the impact of a change in labor costs on the competitiveness of firms on export markets, our paper contributes to the literature on price elasticities in trade. The largest set of papers in this vein uses variation in tariffs and/or exchange rates as price shifters. Berman et al. (2012) , Fitzgerald and Haller (2017) , Bas et al. (2017) , Berthou and Fontagné (2016) are recent contributions that all use firm-level response to ad valorem tariffs and exchange rate variation in export markets. Amiti et al. (2014) and Piveteau and Smagghue (2015) use a related approach, where they calculate the change in marginal cost implied by the initial composition of inputs imported by each firm, interacted with exchange rate changes in its sourcing country, which they use to predict changes in export prices and therefore export values. One of the most important finding of that literature is the so-called international elasticity puzzle: the response of demand to changes in tariffs is much larger than the impact of changes in exchange rates, with elasticities typically being estimated (in absolute value) between 3 and 5 for tariffs, and often lower than 1 for exchange rates. This is a puzzle since most of our theoretical framework would predict those two (delivered) price shifters to have the same effect on trade flows. Fontagné et al. (2017) also use the reaction of firm-level exports to tariffs and exchange rates, but add the impact of changes in f.o.b prices at the firm level instrumented by a cost shifter based on how firms differ in their electricity bill. The idea is that changes in electricity prices are mostly driven by regulatory changes interacted with differences in contract dates and length, that are exogenous to the firm, and do not affect exports directly. This is one of the most proximate investigation to ours since the dimension of the estimating variable is firm-level, with a credible claim for exogeneity and therefore causality in the estimation of the price elasticity. Their results start by reproducing the international elasticity puzzle: the response of exports to changes in tariffs is much larger than the response to changes in exchange rates. They also show that the changes in f.o.b prices by the exporter have a large impact on demand, with an elasticity estimated around − 5. Compared to this literature, we base our estimates of the trade elasticity on a policy change, that affected unit costs of different firms in a heterogeneous manner.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Sect. 2 structures our analysis in terms of the underlying theoretical motivation. Section 3 describes the data used, in particular how we merge the different elements of firm-level data sources to calculate the intensity of treatment of different firms in terms of their labor costs. Section 4 proceeds with results for different margins of adjustment to changes in labor costs, before concluding with Sect. 5.
Theoretical motivation
Our theoretical motivation is based on Crozet et al. (2012) , who develop the firmlevel export predictions of the Melitz (2003) model and in particular its implications in terms of empirical implementation. Firms, indexed i and characterized by their unitary cost i (the inverse of their TFP), operate under monopolistic competition to serve CES consumers in different markets n with their unique variety. Note that we work with exporters from a single origin country, France, and therefore have no origin country subscript. The representative consumer in n has utility where q n ( i ) is the quantity consumed of variety i. The b n ( i ) term is an idiosyncratic demand shock which lowers utility of individuals in n when consuming this precise variety. The pricing part is the usual constant markup over marginal cost
With all those elements at hand, the equilibrium sales of firm i in n write:
where X n and P n respectively represent total expenditure and the ideal CES price index in n. Taking logs, we have an estimable equation where the log exports should
react to any change in marginal costs with an elasticity reflecting the price elasticity of consumers ( 1 − ):
Let us now enter into the details of this cost function. We assume functional form to be a Cobb-Douglas aggregator of several factors, one of which is labor. Among workers, we distinguish between low/medium skill workers who are eligible to CICE and high-skill workers who are not:
where l i represents labor employed, itself a Cobb-Douglas aggregation of eligible ( l e ) and non-eligible ( l n ) parts such that
Other factors k are used in quantities v ik by firm i and we assume constant returns such that:
A set of additional assumptions will greatly ease interpretation of results. Inside a sector s, we assume that (i) unit input requirements ik and factor prices r ik faced by firms are the same, (iii) the share of labor s is constant inside an industry. Unit costs then take the following form:
. It is critical here that (even though we do not model explicitly labor markets for different skills) we let firms have different labor costs. Particularly important will be the fact that different firms have different shares of their labor force eligible to the policy change ( i ), which we consider to be a constant technological parameter.
Substituting (3) in (2), and introducing a time dimension t, the export equation becomes: [ ] makes it explicit that the pre-subsidy wages can be affected by the policy. Equation (6) makes it clear that the direct negative effect of a rise in rate on the effective labor cost can be partly attenuated by a rise in equilibrium pre-subsidy wage. An advantage of our ex-post approach is to capture both direct and indirect effects through which the CICE policy is likely to impact effective labor costs.
3
One can decompose the change in effective labor costs between the part linked to the CICE policy, and the part that would have happened without the policy:
Change in labor costs that would have occurred without the policy 3 The indirect effects are potentially important. The total elasticity of effective labor costs with respect to the subsidy rate writes:
Without the indirect effect, a 50% increase in (which happened between 2013 and 2014, when the rate went from 4 to 6%) has a direct effect of − 1.46% on labor costs if 70% of the firm's wagebill is eligible ( = 0, 7 ). However, this fall will be largely dampened even for very low values of wage elasticities with respect to . For instance, for a 1% elasticity of eligible wages, the overall fall in labor costs is reduced to − 1.1% (− 0.96% if non-eligible wages also react with a 1% elasticity). the elasticities of eligible and non-eligible wages with respect to 1 − . Inserting Eqs. (7) and (8) = 0 ), the coefficient estimated on our treatment variable identifies the product of two structural parameters: labor intensity in sector s multiplied by the price elasticity of demand: (1 − ) s . Considering a labor intensity such that s is in a 20 to 25% range, and a value for around 5 or 6, 5 we expect a coefficient around − 1 of the CICE policy on exported values in the absence of wage response.
Potential effects on wages complexify the interpretation of the coefficient on the treatment variable since it is then (1 − ) s (1 + e w e 1− − e w n 1− ) . The heterogeneity in the effect then comes not only from the factor intensity of this sector, but also from
4 Substituting (7) and (8) in (5), we obtain where ≡ + combines the effects of the set of observables on unit input coefficients and wages. Noting that ln Δ ln(1 − t ), we can regroup terms such that:
[ t ]
the reaction of eligible vs non-eligible labor. The structural interpretation of coefficients is more difficult, although it does not affect the validity of the reduced form identification of the treatment effect. A final issue in estimation of the CICE policy on exports is a selection bias. The flow, ln x int ( i ) , is only observed for the combinations of firm-destinations that are profitable, i.e. when the following condition is met:
This introduces a selection in the sample likely to create a correlation between the error term and RHS variables. For instance, among the firms with high labor costs, only the ones having had a particularly strong draw on the idiosyncratic demand shock 1∕b n will be exporting to n. This will create an attenuation bias in estimated coefficients. A way to minimize the issue is to proceed to robustness checks using a subsample of firms large and productive enough to be considered sufficiently distant from the cost cutoff for profitable exports so that the error term is unlikely to matter much for their entry decision. We follow this approach by focusing some of our analysis on a subsample of firms that serve continuously their markets (destination) during the entire sample period (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) and that belong to the top quartile in terms of number of markets served. 
Data

The genesis of the CICE reform
In this section, we describe the policy we are using in order to gauge to what extent labor costs matter for exporting firms. This policy, labeled CICE by the French authorities, was decided in 2012, in a period of challenging economic situation for the newly elected government. Corporate profits were considered to be at a historically low level 7 and French firms had been rapidly losing market share in foreign markets for several years (Bas et al. 2015) . In that context, the government ordered a report on the state of the manufacturing sector in France (Gallois 2012) . The report, often referred to as Rapport Gallois, named after its main author, advocated in favor of large cuts in payroll taxes for employees earning up to 3.5 times the amount of the current minimum wage. While there had been large cuts in payroll taxes since the early nineties, those were concentrated on low wages. At the time of CICE implementation, those pre-existing tax cuts were indeed concentrated on the bottom of
the wage distribution (up to 1.6 times the minimum wage, see Fig. 1 ). Extending the payroll tax cuts to workers higher up in the wage distribution was presented as a way to target manufacturing and exporting firms who tend to pay higher wages and therefore did not benefit from the pre-existing tax cut programs.
A debate engaged after the initial proposal of the Rapport Gallois, which was considered by many to be too costly and was criticized by labor economists who contended that the employment effects of cuts in payroll taxes are stronger when targeted on low wages where demand is more price elastic and unemployment is high (see Cahuc and Carcillo (2014) for an example of that view). As a compromise, a threshold of 2.5 times the minimum wage was chosen and passed into law. Finally, in order to ease the short-term fiscal impact in a time of tight budgetary constraints, the government chose to opt for a tax credit system rather than a (direct) payroll tax cuts. Firms could claim a corporate tax credit at a rate proportional to the wagebill accrued to workers earning less than 2.5 minimum wages. The rationale for this choice was to change firms' incentives immediately while delaying the budgetary burden of the policy by a year. The policy was put in place in January 2013, with a tax credit rate of 4% (of the wagebill of all workers under 2.5 minimum wages). In January 2014, the rate was raised to 6%. Concretely, in the case of a financial year ending 31 December 2014, the CICE relating to remuneration paid in 2014 is deducted from the tax due for the financial year ending 31 December 2014. In case the CICE amount exceeds the tax that is owed by the firm, the tax credit can be used against taxes due for the next three financial years (e.g. 2015, 2016 and 2017) . After three years, the tax credit is refunded to the firm. Interestingly for our purpose, we note that no other regulatory thresholds existed at 2.5 times the minimum wage prior to this reform.
Moreover the reform is unlikely to have been anticipated by firms. Indeed, as mentioned above, the government's decision to implement the CICE was taken in reaction to the Gallois report about the state of manufacturing in France which was released on November 5, 2012. The original proposal contained in the report was a b Fig. 1 The schedule of the 2014 CICE and of pre-existing payroll tax cuts. a Labor cost reduction as share of gross wage, b Labor cost reduction in euros per year. Note: Prexisting payroll tax cuts refer to the general payroll tax cuts applicable prior to the CICE-so-called "exonérations générales de cotisations sociales" (see Bunel and L'Horty 2012; Cahuc and Carcillo 2014) deemed excessively costly and the actual CICE ended up differing substantially from the proposal: it was implemented as a corporate income tax credit instead of a direct cut in social contribution and, most importantly, its threshold was set up to 2.5 instead of 3.5 times the minimum wage. Little time elapsed between the release of the report-November 5th 2012-and the implementation of the modified version of the CICE beginning January 1st 2013 (from Finance Act of December 29th 2012). This reduces the chances that firms could anticipate and adapt their wage policy in 2012 to maximize the amount of the tax credit to be received based on the 2013 wage structure.
The parameters of the policy
The schedule for the CICE in 2014 is presented in Fig. 1 . The x-axis features the ratio of the worker's wage over minimum wage, while the y-axis represents the reduction in labor cost due to the policy change. Panel (a) shows the reduction in terms of percentage of the total wage paid, while panel (b) expresses it in annual euros saved on each worker. There are two curves on each panel. The first one shows the schedule of payroll tax cut that existed before 2014, and which was maintained as is. The second one shows the tax cut schedule of the CICE: flat at 6% before the 2.5 threshold, 0 afterwards. Marginally, the firm receives a tax credit that is equal in 2014 to 6% (4% in 2013) of the total labor cost on each worker that is paid less than 2.5 times the minimum wage. At the threshold of 2.5 times the minimum wage, the firm gets a tax credit that amounts to about 2500 euros per worker-year.
It is important to note that the discontinuity occurs at the worker level, while our variables of interest (export performance, labor cost) are intrinsically defined at the firm-level. We could exploit a discontinuity at the firm-level if we focused on those firms whose entire workforce is located slightly below the 2.5 minimum wage threshold (fully treated) versus firms paying all of its employees just above the threshold (untreated). However, all firms in our sample exhibit sufficient wage variation to make it impossible to implement a firm-level regression discontinuity design. Against this difficulty, we choose to rely on continuous variation in treatment-which is the sum of worker-level binary eligibility variables-within a difference-in-difference setting.
How much does each firm receive in terms of tax cuts therefore depends on the composition of its labor force. A firm that has all of its employees paid at the minimum wage sees its labor costs reduced by 4% between 2012 and 2013. At the other extreme, a firm where every employee earns more than the 2.5 threshold is not treated and has unchanged labor costs. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the treatment intensity in our sample of continuing exporters between 2010 and 2015. Panel (a) spans over firms, and shows a histogram of the CICE-implied labor cost reduction in the first two years of treatment, based on the amount truly received. While a substantial share of exporters have all of their employees under the threshold, 8 and therefore have an overall treatment of 4% in 2013 and 6% in 2014, there is substantial variation of the intensity of treatment in the population of French exporters. Panel (b) shows the most affected industries in our sample, calculating the average intensity of treatment across the 2-digit manufacturing industries to which our exporters belong. Wood, Furniture, Food and Textile are among the industries where continuing exporters are the most heavily treated. Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, Beverages, are representative examples of the other side of the spectrum, where wages are high enough for a large portion of the employees to be untreated.
Firm-level trade and workers
Firm-level data come from a combination of four sources. The first one is produced by the customs office, and compiles the exported values and quantities for each firm-destination-product combination. The second one, produced by the French statistical institute (INSEE), contains balance-sheet data for firms. It uses the same identifier for the firm, and is mostly used in our sample to obtain control variables, such as value-added or the capital stock. The third source is the employer-employee data also created by INSEE, and named DADS. All workers of a given firm (identified with same number as the two other sources) are recorded in DADS, which we use to obtain hourly wages. This very rich source is critical for calculating the predicted intensity of treatment at the firm level. The fourth source is an administrative file, named MVC, that contains the actual amount of tax credit claimed by each firm. We use it to compute the treatment intensity which we will then instrument with the predicted treatment intensity as computed using the DADS dataset. We keep firms that are present in all four datasets and for which the main activity reported belongs to manufacturing. Furthermore, we exclude firms that are in the top percentile in terms of CICE intensity (those do report considerably more than that the maximum rate that should be possible to claim) in any given year. We finally focus on a balanced sample of firms present in the dataset over the 2010-2015 period.
The sample we use for the extensive margin analysis is the set of firms that are continuously present in the balance-sheet and employer-employee datasets over the 2010-2015 period. The one we use for the intensive margin analysis is the set of continuous exporters over the same period. We refer to the first and second samples with ME and MI respectively. The MI sample (described in Table 1 ) exhibits a ratio of tax credit over wagebill that is smaller than the ME one (described in Table 2 ). This reflects the usually found overall exporter premium on variables such as valueadded, size and wages also found here. Even though the MI firms constitute a sample of manufacturing firms that are productive enough to remain exporters over the whole sample, the ratio of exported value over total sales is still at a low 12.4% for the median firm, which typically serves 7 markets. The average ratio of exports to total sales is at 25%. Table 2 also shows that the proportion of exporters is 37%. Both numbers are higher than the usual figures for the US (18% for average exporter shares, 14% for ratio of export value over total sales) reported in Bernard et al. (2007) . Note however that the sample here is manufacturing only, and constrained to continued presence in several firm-level datasets over 5 years, which probably selects larger firms. Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) report export participation rates and share of exports in total sales that are very comparable to ours for several European countries with samples constrained to have firms above a certain size.
Results
Descriptive evidence
One important characteristic of the CICE policy is that it mostly affects firms that were initially less export-oriented. Firms that do export in positive amounts, and those that have the highest share of exports in their total sales tend to pay higher wages, and are therefore the ones where the treatment is less intense. Panels (a) and The top 5% CICE recipients (as a share of wagebill) in 2013 had an average ratio of exports over turnover of 17% in 2012. The same ratio for the bottom 5% of recipients was 40%. The extensive margin evidence is more complex, and clearly nonmonotonous in the top part of the treatment intensity.
The impact of CICE on exports
Empirical approach
We implement the estimation of Eq. (9) at the destination × firm-level. We choose to retain the destination dimension despite the fact that our variable of interest only varies at the firm-level because destination-specific shocks that are potentially correlated with exposure to the labor cost reduction induced by the policy could cause bias in our estimates. The estimating equation writes as follows:
the empirical counterpart of the treatment variable
We denote with C it the amount of CICE subsidy received and W it as total (gross) wagebill.
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′ it includes a list of controls likely to drive the evolution of firm-level unit costs, beyond the global evolution of the sector in France captured by st -which is a 3-digit sector × year fixed-effect. In order to causally assess the impact of the cut in payroll taxes, we use an instrumental variable Z it corresponding to lagged predicted amount received i,t−1 ln(1 − it ) , used either directly or as an instrument for D it , and constructed as
wagebill i,2012 × ln 1 − t , 10 We could have built the variable it ln(1 − t ) using solely the DADS matched employer-employee, computing the wage share of eligible labor ( it ) and applying the rate of subsidy ln(1 − t ) . The resulting variable should be equal to our measure C it ∕W it -where the denominator is computed using the DADS dataset and the numerator comes from a special administrative file on claimed tax credits (MVC). Nevertheless it is only approximately true due to the fact that minor components of labor earning to which the tax credit do not apply are included in the DADS measure of wages-e.g. work-related expenses. We therefore prefer to use the C it ∕W it ratio. The variable ln(1 − C it ∕W it ) is a very close counterpart to the variable relevant in the theoretical framework as both variables are equal up to a first-order approximation. Indeed we can see (i) that it ln(1 − t ) ≈ − it t where the first-order approximation is taken around t = 0 and (ii) that ln(1 − C it ∕W it ) ≈ −C it ∕W it = − it t where the first-order approximation is taken around C it ∕W it = 0 . The correlation between it ln(1 − t ) and ln(1 − it t ) is extremely close to 1, suggesting that the first-order approximation is uninfluential. The correlation between it ln(1 − t ) and ln(1 − C it ∕W it ) is 0.8, suggesting moderate discrepancy between the MVC and DADS files. We choose to rely on the MVC to obtain C it as it documents directly the amount claimed by the firms.
where t is the rate of payroll tax cut implied by the CICE policy, 4% in 2013, 6% since 2014.
First stage: graphical evidence
We present graphical evidence regarding the first-stage of our instrumentation strategy in Fig. 4 among the sample of continuing exporters (left panel) and all firms (right panel). For both sample, we see a clear positive relationship between the instrumental and the endogenous variables that is approximately linear, when aggregating over 20 bins of the instrument. Econometric estimates of the first stage can be found in the last rows of Table 4 .
OLS and IV results
Putting aside causality issues as a start, we first present regressions between the amount of subsidy received and export performance, that should be interpreted as correlations without taking a stance on the direction of causality. Results for several specifications are presented in Table 3 . The first three columns include all firms, while the last three limit attention to the set of firms considered far enough from the truncation point of profitable exports so that selection issues should be minimized. Those are the ones that serve continuously their markets over the entire sample period (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) and belong to the top quartile of exporters in terms of number of destination. We experiment with different sets of fixed effects and controls over columns. Columns (1), (2), (4) and (5) simply have sector-year effects, while columns (3) and (6) introduce destinationyear effects. The treatment intensity variable has the expected negative sign but is too noisy to be significant in all columns. The magnitude of the coefficient is also smaller than expected, given reasonable estimates of consumers' price elasticity and the share of labor in production costs. We now turn to instrumented results, meant to provide a better assessment of the causal effect of the subsidy. An example of endogeneity issue is the tendency of firms experiencing a boom in their exports to "share the rent" with workers through wage increases (see e.g. Carluccio et al. 2015) . These wage increases directly impact the CICE treatment variable, which is affected by the share of the wagebill under a certain threshold. This is only one of the many causes that could induce a correlation between the unobserved determinants of export performance (the error term of Eq. 11) and the subsidy received. Most of the endogeneity concerns suggest an attenuation bias. For instance, reverse causality could even be at work since a negative draw on export markets' performance (losing a large contract for instance) could result in wage cuts, making the firm more eligible to CICE.
We therefore instrument the intensity of treatment by a variable that is using the wage structure of the firm before the policy was put in place. This IV is the level of subsidy that the firm was expected to receive from its historical wage distribution. Table 4 report results of the instrumented version of the regressions.
The coefficients obtained are both larger (in absolute value) and more statistically significant. The coefficients obtained for large firms (last 3 columns) Robust standard errors reported in parentheses (clustered at the firm level). Δx t ≡ x t+1 − x t . * p < 0.10 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01 . Our explanatory variable of interest (actual or instrumented) measures the change in labor costs implied by the CICE policy. The expected sign is therefore negative: a rise in labor cost should reduce exports. The balanced sample covers the years 2012 to 2014 (two period with first differences)
All firms
Large firms are close to − 1. Assuming a share of labor in total costs around 20% implies a price elasticity of demand around 6, compatible with existing literature estimating this elasticity on firm-level exports [Fontagné et al. (2017) being a recent example, particularly relevant since it estimates the trade elasticity using a cost shifter-electricity prices-on French exporters]. Adding controls at the firm level and fixed effects for destinations however reduces the magnitude and significance of the effect. This points to a lack of robustness in the effect of this policy on the intensive margin of exports.
Long-difference regressions
We have failed at this point to detect robust effects of the policy on export revenues. It is possible that the policy took time to be effective if, for instance, firms used the subsidy to invest in quality upgrading or in an improvement of the production process. We estimate a slightly different specification from Eq. (11) in order to allow for Table 4 Received CICE and exports (IV)
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses (clustered at the firm level). Δx t ≡ x t+1 − x t . * p < 0.10 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01 . Our explanatory variable of interest (actual or instrumented) measures the change in labor costs implied by the CICE policy. The expected sign is therefore negative: a rise in labor cost should reduce exports. The balanced sample covers the years 2012 to 2014 (two period with first differences). K-P Statistic refers to the Kleibergen-Paap statistic for the first stage
All firms Large firms both time-varying effects and potentially lagged effects of the policy. We keep one observation per firm and project directly the change in export revenue with respect to 2012 for several different time horizons onto the average policy-induced labor cost variation between 2012 and 2015. As above, the actual policy-induced labor cost variation received is instrumented using the treatment as predicted by the 2012 wage structure. This method has the advantage of allowing for time-varying effects and does not impose dynamic restrictions on the estimates (Jordà 2005; Zidar 2018) . Results are presented in Table 5 . Results are overall disappointing. In the largest sample, the magnitude of coefficients is comparable to the ones from Table 4 , but estimates are noisy and sensitive to the period considered when estimating the effect. In the sample focusing on large firms, which is our preferred one for the selection issues mentioned at the end of the theory section, we again find volatile effects, with one coefficient even exhibiting a perverse positive sign. To summarize, the policy under investigation has mostly shown no robust effect on the intensive margin of exporting patterns. We cannot completely discard the possibility that this policy aimed at reducing labor costs has a delayed effect being channeled through long-run investment decisions. However, with the data at hand, which is limited to 3 years post treatment, our results do not strongly point in that direction.
Were more profitable firms more reactive to the policy?
As explained in Sect. 3.1, the CICE is a corporate income tax credit aiming at "mimicking" the effects of a direct cut in payroll tax. Therefore, firms which do not report any taxable profits do not face the same incentives as the ones that can deduct from their corporate taxation the total amount they are entitled to. To enter the details of the policy: a firm with negative or near zero profits in year t does not benefit from the tax credit accrued based on its wagebill during year t − 1 at year t but will instead need to wait until t + 1 in case it generates enough taxable income during that period. Firms that are not profitable at any point past t will have to wait for three years until the tax authorities transfer the amount of the tax credit to the firm. In order to investigate the heterogeneity of effects based on profitability, we introduce an interaction term between the intensity of treatment and a dummy variable which is set to one if the firm reported positive corporate income tax every year between 2010 and 2012 ( TP i ). We expect this interaction term to have a negative sign, since it signals a larger impact of the policy for the firms that are likely to obtain the tax credit with the least lag. Results are presented in Table 6 . They are somehow supportive of the idea that firms are sensitive to the lag between the payroll tax cut entitlement and its payment: all interaction terms are negative, although not significantly so. This points to the fact that the precise design of this type of policy matters: blurring the connection between the labor cost determinants of the tax cut and the actual payment of the cut (through a delay in this case) seems to weaken the effects of the policy.
Other outcomes
The impact of the CICE policy on export prices
The overall absence of statistically significant impact of the policy could come from two main causes. The first is that the fall in labor costs is not (or incompletely) passed by firms into their export prices. In that case, the price competitiveness of firms benefiting from the policy would not be affected. The second is that the price elasticity of demand is too low to enable detection of a statistically significant effect.
Our data enables us to calculate unit values which is the best we can do to measure (f.o.b) export prices, dividing value exported by quantities (measured in tons in the customs files). Some (firm × destination) couples have no quantity available which explains why there is a slightly lower number of observations compared to regressions from Table 4 . We first investigate the statistical association between export prices and the policy without looking for the direction of causality. Results are reported in Table 7 , with the same set of specifications as in our benchmark on export values. The expected magnitude of the coefficient is quite intuitive. With constant markups, the pass-through elasticity of changes in costs should be one. Therefore, the expected impact on unit values should reflect the share of labor in total marginal costs of the firms.
Results show that the response of prices to the amount of labor cost subsidy received depends upon the size of firms. In the full sample, the coefficients imply labor costs shares between 12 and 35% which is reasonable, but none of those effects is significant. For larger firms, the implied shares are much lower, which is probably intuitive, but again the effect is not statistically different from 0. In sum, the passthrough into export prices is weak at best. One interpretation is that signs and magnitudes of the volume and price effects are coherent, and reasonably consistent with Table 6 Received CICE and exports (IV), heterogeneity based on profitability Robust standard errors reported in parentheses (clustered at the firm level). Δx t ≡ x t+1 − x t . * p < 0.10 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01 . Our explanatory variable of interest (actual or instrumented) measures the change in labor costs implied by the CICE policy. The expected sign is therefore negative: a rise in labor cost should reduce exports. The balanced sample covers the years 2012-2014 (two period with first differences). K-P Statistic refers to the Kleibergen-Paap statistic for the first stage. TP is a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm reported positive corporate income tax during every year between 2010 and 2012. It does not vary over time and is therefore omitted in columns (4) and (6) All firms Large firms expectations, despite large amount of noise (perhaps due to the complex design of the policy). The other interpretation, is that firms did not consider this policy to be a "true" reduction in labor costs, that could translate into lower prices and large export volumes, explaining that we find no robust effect at the intensive margin.
Impact on the extensive margin
It is possible (although unlikely and not fully consistent with the benchmark model of heterogeneous firms in trade) that the whole of the effects of the evaluated policy took place at the extensive margin, i.e. boosting the entry rate of French firms on different export markets. In order to allow for a rich structure of fixed effects that is needed in our context we use the Linear Probability Model (LPM) in order to investigate this extensive margin of adjustment to labor cost changes in first-difference. Our dependent variable in the first two columns is identifying entry (1 if the firm did not export in t − 1 and does in t, and 0 if it did not change status and − 1 if it ceased to export between t − 1 and t). The last two columns re-estimate the model in levels, where the LHS is the export status each year. We find again no statistical evidence of a change in export status that could be attributed to the change in labor costs (Table 8) .
Comparing ex-post and ex-ante analysis
As an alternative to the ex-post analysis conducted until now, we consider the following ex-ante approach: (1) estimate the impact of unit labor costs on exports in the period immediately preceding the treatment (2010-2012), (2) combining those estimates with the percent change in the labor costs implied by the CICE policy, one can predict what is the expected change in export values linked to the policy. We proceed with step 1 following closely the approach by Decramer et al. (2016) , with the LHS being the change in logged export values, and the RHS being the change in unit labor costs (measured as wagebill over value added of the firm). 11 Table 9 reports results and contrary to preceding tables, the overall picture is one of negative significant effect of unit labor costs on export patterns. The elasticities are quite robust in significance and magnitude over different specifications ranging from 17 to 20%. Column (4), which is the most comparable to the specification of Decramer et al. (2016) , finds an elasticity of − 0.20. Those coefficients are strikingly close to those Table 8 Received CICE and export probability (IV) Robust standard errors reported in parentheses (clustered at the firm level). Δx t ≡ x t+1 − x t . * p < 0.10 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01 . Our explanatory variable of interest (actual or instrumented) measures the change in labor costs implied by the CICE policy. The expected sign is therefore negative: a rise in labor cost should reduce exports. Controls include VA per worker, value of assets, average wage and total hours workers in the firm (lagged and log) obtained by Decramer et al. (2016) , who also find − 0.2 for manufacturing Belgian exporters between 1999 and 2010. 12 We can calculate the "mechanical" fall in labor costs due to the CICE policy by removing the received subsidy from the total wagebill. This reduction in the unit labor costs was around 1.9% on average in our intensive margin sample between 2012 and 2013. Using this fall combined with coefficients from Table 9 , one can quantify that the policy was ex-ante predicted to have a large effect on exports, raising its average growth rate by 0.34 percentage points between 2012 and 2013.
It is therefore a case where the ex-ante and ex-post analysis of a policy measure differ dramatically. In our view, those contrasting results suggest a need for careful interpretation of ex-ante approaches, in particular in terms of identification of the effect that is used in the first step and its relevance for the actual policy carried over.
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Conclusion
Our paper investigates the impact of a change in labor costs on export patterns. Using a large panel of French firms, we use a recent policy experiment where a share of gross wages is reimbursed to firms via a tax credit. Firms are treated according to a threshold applied to each employees' compensation. We use the variation in treatment implied by this rule to assess whether export values and/or the probability of participating in export markets is affected by labor costs. Table 9 Unit labor cost and exports (2010) (2011) (2012) Robust standard errors reported in parentheses (clustered at the firm level). Δx t ≡ x t+1 − x t . * p < 0.10 , **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01 . Our explanatory variable is defined as the log of labor compensation over valued-added. The expected sign is therefore negative: a rise in labor cost should reduce exports. The balanced sample covers the years 2010 to 2012. Exports are aggregated at the firm-year level in level before computing the logarithm We first find a negative albeit insignificant correlation between exported values and the intensity of policy treatment. This could be explained by issues of reverse causality, whereby firms experiencing negative demand shocks lower their employees' wage rate and therefore are targeted more generously by the tax credit. However, our instrumentation strategy also points to statistically insignificant effects. Essentially, signs and magnitudes of our estimates are as expected, but very noisy. This lack of precision is not related to a weak first-stage as our instrument is strongly predictive of the actual treatment. There are in our view two interpretations.
First, while our instrument solves the issue of reverse causation between the outcome and the policy treatment, it does not solve entirely the issue of unobserved heterogeneity. Time-varying controls and allowing sectors to be flexibly affected by the business cycle is the best we can do on that front but might still be insufficient. The second interpretation is that the policy itself failed to deliver the expected effect of a cut in labor cost. This could be explained by the complex design of the policy which took the form of a tax credit rather than a direct cut in payroll taxes.
We note that the transformation of the CICE from a tax credit into a payroll tax cut has been quite consensual among both government officials and employers' representatives. We interpret this convergence in opinions as evidence supporting the second interpretation. The likely transformation of the policy, due to take place in 2019, should offer a nice setup for future research to disentangle the respective influence of research versus policy design on the disappointing estimated results of the policy.
Appendix
See Fig. 5 
